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1 
ARGUMENT 
I. ZAMORA IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS PRECEDENT FOR 
THE PROPOSITION THAT THE BOND AND 
UNDERTAKING STATUTES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
 
Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981), should be overruled because: 
 (a) Zamora upheld a statute that (1) treated plaintiffs suing police officers 
differently than all other plaintiffs and (2) treated police officer defendants differently than 
all other defendants, without any showing that the discrimination—severely obstructing, if 
not entirely preventing, access to the courts—met the applicable strict scrutiny test, nor the 
intermediate scrutiny test, nor even the wholly inapplicable rational basis test; 
 (b) Zamora ignored the absence of a due process hearing prior to the deprivation of 
property required by the bond statute; and 
 (c) Zamora erroneously scrutinized the bond statute under the minimal standard of 
rational basis when a higher level of scrutiny was required because the statute severely 
burdens, if not entirely obstructs, the right of access to the courts. That right has been held 
in cases involving claims under the United States Constitution to be a “fundamental right,” 
requiring “strict scrutiny,” and has been held by the Utah Supreme Court to be an 
“important” right, requiring “heightened scrutiny,” in cases analyzed under the Uniform 
Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution.  
A. Plaintiffs Wrongfully Injured by Police Officers Are 
Constitutionally Protected Against the Extremely 
Burdensome, If Not Entirely Insurmountable, Barriers 
Caused by the Bond and Undertaking Statutes.
 
 
 
 
2 
The stated purpose in Zamora for creating a class distinction among tortfeasors is 
protecting police officers “against frivolous and/or vexatious lawsuits.” 635 P.2d at 81.1 
The requirement of a bond, however, does not meet strict or intermediate scrutiny, nor does 
it even meet minimal scrutiny, because neither the State nor Appellees have provided any 
support for the notion that more frivolous or vexatious lawsuits are filed against police 
officer defendants than against other defendants. See Psych. Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 
419, 425 (Fl. 1992); Detraz v. Fontana, 416 So. 2d 1291, 1296 (La. 1982) (“It is argued 
that the bond requirement is a justifiable means to deter frivolous suits instituted against 
public officials for harassment. No support for the suggestion that suits are brought against 
public officials for harassment with greater frequency than suits against other defendants 
has been presented in brief or in argument. . . . No reasonable justification for this disparate 
treatment has been supplied.”).  
Appellees argue “[t]he conclusion the Court reached in Zamora is correct because 
the bond statute does not eliminate a legal remedy.” Suppl. Br. of Appellees at 3–4. 
                                                 
1 Appellees argue Kendall’s claims relating to the killing of his dog are the type of 
“frivolous” claims intended to be deterred by the Bond Statute, pointing to the recent 
decision in the Federal District Court holding that the individual defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity. Suppl. Br. of Appellees at 10, n.14. That decision is being appealed, 
in part, because it did not apply the binding Fourth Amendment test. No decision has yet 
been reached on Kendall’s state claims, including claims under the Utah Constitution. Utah 
law, similarly to the controlling federal rule, requires that, for a warrantless search 
conducted under the guise of the emergency aid doctrine, there must be a nexus between 
the place to be searched and the emergency. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 
UT App 12, ¶ 35, 994 P.2d 1283 (“When a search is performed in an emergency situation, 
the area searched must have a close connection to the emergency. Specifically, there must 
be a nexus between the emergency situation and the area or place to be searched.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 
 
3 
Puzzlingly, Appellees state that “[a] necessary pre-requisite to every open courts challenge 
is that the statute at issue abrogate a legal remedy.” Suppl. Br. of Appellees, 3. However, 
the bond statute did abrogate a remedy when it imposed tremendous, if not impossible-to-
satisfy, burdens on prospective plaintiffs seeking a remedy against law enforcement 
officers. Also, and most fundamentally, the Open Courts Clause protects more than 
Appellees admit. The Open Courts Clause “imposes a substantive limitation on the 
legislature's ability to eliminate or unduly restrict causes of action seeking relief for injury 
to ‘person, property, or reputation.’ ”  Day v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1999 
UT 46, ¶ 37, 980 P.2d 1171, 1184 (emphasis added) (quoting Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985)); see also Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1250 (Utah 1998) 
(“While this clause may not guarantee any specific remedy, it certainly guarantees access 
to the courts.”); Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992) (stating if a 
statute “precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the open courts provision 
and is unconstitutional as applied.” (emphasis added)); Burgandy v. State, Dep't of Human 
Servs., 1999 UT App 208, ¶ 18, 983 P.2d 586 (finding no violation of Open Courts Clause 
where statute “does not deny, restrict, chill, burden, or impose conditions upon appellant's 
right and ability to access the courts” (emphasis added)).  
Before filing his complaint on the merits, Kendall faced extremely oppressive, 
costly, time-wasting, and wholly unreasonable burdens. Those burdens are not faced by 
any plaintiffs other than those who allege they are victims of police officer wrongdoing. 
Having no guidance as to how a plaintiff can procedurally meet the requirements of the 
Bond Statute, Kendall first filed a complaint for declaratory judgment challenging the 
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constitutionality of the Bond and Undertaking Statutes and asked, in the alternative, for the 
court to determine the bond and undertaking amounts and to find that Kendall was unable 
to provide the bond or undertaking. Kendall did not know whether he would be required to 
post a bond or undertaking until nearly nine months2 later, after costly legal research, 
drafting of pleadings, motions, and memoranda, and an extensive evidentiary hearing. To 
this day, there has been no determination by the trial court, as required by the Bond Statute, 
of the amount of officers’ future costs and attorneys’ fees, in relation to which amount 
Kendall’s impecuniosity or non-impecuniosity must be measured.3 Just like Kendall, other 
plaintiffs4 have faced these Herculean, if not impossible, challenges5 to obtain access to 
                                                 
2 The Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was filed on January 26, 2015. R. 1–19. Kendall 
was determined to be impecunious on September 21, 2015, R. 592–600, after a lengthy and 
complicated evidentiary hearing on September 15, 2015. R. 621–792. 
3 If Kendall’s appeal to the Tenth Circuit is successful, then he will again be before the 
Federal District Court, subject to DUCivR 67-1(c), which provides “[t]he court may 
review, fix, and adjust the amount of the required undertaking or bond as provided by law.” 
The ability of the court to change the amount of the bond, after the complaint has been 
filed is at direct odds with the requirement of the Bond Statute that the bond must be filed 
before the complaint in an amount that “shall cover all estimated costs and attorney fees 
the officer may be expected to incur in defending the action[.]” Utah Code § 78B-3-104.  
4 Many victims have suffered the dismissal of their claims for failure to comply with the 
Bond and Undertaking Statutes. See George v. Beaver County, 2017 WL 782287 (D. Utah 
Feb. 28, 2017) (dismissing state law claims without prejudice for failure to post bond 
required by Utah Code § 78B-3-104); Craig v. Provo City, 2016 UT 40, --- P.3d --- (holding 
that claim dismissed without prejudice for failure to file undertaking required by Utah Code 
§ 63G-7-601(2) cannot be revived by invoking the saving provision of Utah Code § 78B-
2-111); Swasey v. West Valley City, 2015 WL 500870 (D. Utah Feb. 5, 2015) (dismissing 
state law claims without prejudice for failure to file undertaking); Br. of Appellant at 35 
(citing other cases in which claims have been dismissed for failure or inability to meet the 
draconian requirements of the bond and/or undertaking statutes).  
5 The Utah Federal Court has, through DUCivR 67-1(c) completely disregarded the 
requirement of the Bond Statute that the “bond shall cover all estimated costs and attorney 
fees the officer may be expected to incur in defending the action[.]” (Emphasis added.) The 
local rules of practice for the Utah federal court do not have the authority to unilaterally 
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the courts for a consideration of their claims under state law and the Utah Constitution.6  
Further, Zamora gave no consideration to the deterrent effects of the Bond Statute 
on non-impecunious prospective plaintiffs, who face a tremendous price of admission to 
the courts in violation of the Open Courts Clause. 635 P.2d 78 at 80–81. Appellees misstate 
Appellant’s argument as only concerning “financial risks.”7 Prospective plaintiffs subject 
to the Bond Statute face not only risk, but concrete losses.  As held in Beaudreau:  
If [a plaintiff] . . . secures his undertaking from a corporate surety . . . he will 
at least be deprived of his nonrefundable premium; if he deposits money in 
court in lieu of an undertaking, he will be deprived of its use during the 
pendency of the action. If the plaintiff [refuses to comply with an undertaking 
requirement] and incurs dismissal of his action, he will also have suffered a 
‘taking’ of his property, since his claim against a public entity or public 
employee . . . is a ‘property interest’ within the meaning of the due process 
clause.”  
 
Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 713, 717–18 (Cal. 1975). 
 Those losses and the immense procedural obstacles to, if not impossibility of, 
compliance with the bond requirement8 are diametrically the opposite of “reasonable 
access” to the courts for victims of police officer tortfeasors.  
  
                                                 
change the requirements of the Bond Statute, leaving plaintiffs following DUCivR 67-1(c) 
in fear of dismissal for failure to comply with the statute. Therefore, to avoid the risk of 
dismissal, plaintiffs must obtain a determination by the court, before filing a complaint, of 
the bond amount or refrain from bringing claims under the laws or constitution of the State 
of Utah.  
6 Many potential plaintiffs give up their state claims because of the daunting, often 
prohibitive, costs and procedural barriers. Br. of Appellant at 15–17.  
7 Suppl. Br. of Appellees, 6–7 (“[T]he Court may disregard the claim that the bond statute 
is unconstitutional on its face because it discourages people that are not impecunious from 
bringing claims because of the financial risks involved.”) 
8 See Suppl. Br. of Appellant, 5–7, 9–11.  
 
 
6 
B. The Bond Statute in Zamora Did Not, and the Bond and 
Undertaking Statutes at Issue Here Do Not, Allow for a Pre-
Deprivation Due Process Hearing to Determine the Merits of 
the Prospective Action and the Reasonableness of the Amount 
of the Bond or Undertaking.  
 
Zamora does not address whether the bond statute comports with due process and 
is therefore not entitled to stare decisis on that claim.9 Because the bond requirement 
constitutes a taking, victims of police officer tortfeasors are entitled to a hearing inquiring 
into the merits of the claim and the amount of the bond, which hearing is not allowed under 
the bond statute.10  
Under the fundamental notions of due process. . . , the taking to which a 
plaintiff is subjected under the above [cost undertaking] statutes must be 
preceded by a hearing in the particular case in order to determine whether the 
statutory purpose is promoted by the imposition of the undertaking 
requirement. As these statutes are purportedly designed to protect public 
entities and public employees against the cost of defending frivolous 
lawsuits, a due process hearing would necessarily inquire into the merit of 
the plaintiff’s action as well as into the reasonableness of the amount of the 
undertaking in the light of the defendant’s probable expenses. 
 
Beaudreau, 535 P.2d at 720. See also Gonzales v. Fox, 68 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 18–19 
(Cal. App. 1977); Detraz, 416 So. 2d at 1297. 
Appellees misleadingly attempt to distinguish Detraz and Siegel because they 
“concern bond statutes that, unlike Utah’s statute, do not concern a reciprocal attorney fee 
provisions [sic] and do not include provisions that allow a court to set the amount of the 
                                                 
9 Suppl. Br. of Appellees, 8. (“The Zamora decision does not contain any specific 
discussion of whether the bond statute violates due process because the plaintiff did not 
challenge the statute on those grounds.”). 
10 Requiring a limited class of plaintiffs to engage in such a hearing on the merits of their 
claims may, in itself, be grounds for a substantial equal protection challenge. 
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bond commensurate with the party’s ability to pay.” Br. of Appellees at 31.11 According to 
Appellees, “[t]he courts in those cases found those facts important in reaching the 
conclusion that the statutes at issue violated substantive due process.” Id. 
First, contrary to Appellees’ characterization, Detraz stated that “[a]s in this case, 
decisional law allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to qualify to proceed in forma 
pauperis.”12 416 So. 2d at 1296 (emphasis added). Detraz also stated “the court held that a 
bond for attorney’s fees could not be imposed on an indigent.” Id. at 1294. Never does 
Detraz indicate its holding depended on either a lack of a reciprocal attorney fee provision 
or a lack of flexibility given to courts to reduce the bond amount for some plaintiffs. 
Second, in Siegel, it was not the holding of the case, but simply the opinion of only 
one justice, that relied on there being no flexibility to reduce the bond amount to find the 
statutes unconstitutional. 610 So. 2d at 426 (Grimes, J., concurring in result only). The lack 
of reciprocity in the attorneys’ fee provision was merely considered to be an additional 
constitutional infirmity of the statutes. Id. at 425 (“[T]he bond requirement is also 
unreasonable because the statutes lack reciprocity[.]”). Siegel primarily addressed the lack 
                                                 
11 Appellees do not provide supplemental briefing with respect to Due Process, but refer to 
their Appellee Brief. Suppl. Br. of Appellees at 9. Appellants therefore respond to the 
argument raised in the Appellee Brief as it relates to the issue uniquely before this Court, 
i.e., whether Zamora and its unreasoning progeny should be overruled.  
12 Detraz makes no citation to any case or statute for the proposition, but appears to be 
referring to LSA-C.C.P. Art. 5181 (“[A]n individual who is unable to pay the costs of court 
because of his poverty and lack of means may prosecute or defend a judicial proceeding in 
any trial or appellate court without paying the costs in advance or as they accrue or 
furnishing security therefor.”). 
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of a reasonable relationship between the legislative purpose of deterring frivolous suits and 
the bond requirement that was imposed without regard to the frivolousness of the suit.  
Under the bond requirement statutes, all plaintiffs, regardless of the merits 
of their claims, must post a bond before proceeding with their action. This 
requirement will not necessarily discourage frivolous lawsuits of the rich, but 
only those lawsuits where the plaintiff is too poor to post the bond. Thus, the 
effect of the bond requirement is to discourage lawsuits based on the 
plaintiff's financial ability rather the merits of the claim. Further, under the 
bond requirement, a plaintiff with a complex meritorious case would have to 
post a larger bond than a plaintiff with a simple but frivolous case. Thus, as 
Judge Anstead stated, “[t]his kind of provision may net some sharks, but only 
at the price of also netting a substantial number of innocent fish.” 
Siegel, 610 So. 2d at 425 (citations omitted).  
 
C. Because the Bond Statute Impinged on the Fundamental Right 
of Access to the Courts, Zamora Erred by Reviewing the 
Statute Under the Rational Basis Standard. 
 
 Appellees attempt to foreclose Appellant Kendall’s argument that heightened 
scrutiny applies to a due process analysis because Appellant’s Brief argued only that the 
challenged statutes do not meet the standard under a rational basis test. Suppl. Br. of 
Appellees at 9, n.13; Br. of Appellees at 28, n.13. First, however, the level of scrutiny to 
be applied is not a distinct issue raised for the first time in the reply. Second, Appellees 
were on notice and were in no way prejudiced by the omission in the opening brief. See Br. 
of Appellees at 28, n.13. Third, the opening brief argued access to the courts is a 
fundamental right,13 which determines that due process will be analyzed under strict 
scrutiny. Fourth, the Court should decide the constitutional challenges on the merits, 
applying the correct standard of review regardless of any perceived defect in the way a 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 29–30.  
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party initially briefed the standard of review, particularly after that defect was candidly 
conceded and counsel notified opposing counsel well before Brief of Appellees was filed 
so there could be no claim of prejudice.  
For federal claims, access to the courts is a fundamental right.14 A statute that 
impinges on access to the courts triggers strict scrutiny under equal protection15 and 
substantive due process challenges.16  
For claims brought under the Utah Constitution, “[a]s a majority of the Utah 
Supreme Court noted, ‘this court has consistently rejected the presumption of 
constitutionality of statutes challenged under the remedies clause of article I, section 11.’”  
Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, 67 P.3d 436 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) 
(writing for a majority of the Court). Statutes that implicate access to the courts are 
reviewed under heightened scrutiny in uniform operation of law challenges.17 Statutes that 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1427–28 (8th 
Cir. 1986); Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853 (10th Cir. 1985) (“The right of access 
to the courts is basic to our system of government, and it is well established today that it is 
one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.” (quoting Ryland v. Shapiro, 
708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir.1983)). 
15 KT & G Corp v. Attorney Gen. of State of Okla., 535 F.3d 1114, 1137 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“When a classification . . . involves a fundamental right, we will apply strict scrutiny. To 
survive strict scrutiny, the government must show that its classification is narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling government interest.” (citation omitted)).  
16 Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, ¶¶ 26–27, 359 P.3d 603, 609 (“When the court has 
recognized a due process right it deems ‘fundamental,’ it consistently has applied a 
standard of strict scrutiny to the protection of such a right. The strict scrutiny standard is a 
stiff one. Under this standard, a fundamental right is protected except in the limited 
circumstance in which an infringement of it is shown to be ‘narrowly tailored’ to protect a 
‘compelling governmental interest.’ ” (footnotes and citations omitted)). 
17 Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 28, 116 P.3d 295 (“When evaluating 
a challenge under the uniform operation of laws provision . . . . we review statutory 
classifications that implicate rights protected by the open courts clause under ‘heightened 
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implicate fundamental rights are reviewed under strict scrutiny in due process challenges.18  
CONCLUSION 
 
 Zamora and its progeny that, without further analysis, blindly followed Zamora, 
should be recognized as the oppressive tools they have become for legislative abuse and 
immense obstacles, and often insurmountable blockades, to the pursuit of justice through 
the courts for those who have been harmed as a result of violations of state law by police 
officers. One category of plaintiffs suffering the discriminatory barriers of the Bond and 
Undertaking Statutes should no longer, as a practical matter, be left with only federal legal 
protections, while being deprived of the protections provided by the Utah Constitution, as 
well as the purported, yet—because of the Bond and Undertaking Statutes—often 
meaningless, protections under state statutory and common law.   
 
                                                 
scrutiny.’ ” (citations omitted)); Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 19, 103 P.3d 135 
(“Sustaining legislation against an article I, section 24 challenge alleging that one's rights 
under the Open Courts Clause are constitutionally discriminated against requires the court 
to find that the challenged legislation ‘(1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative 
tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers 
a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative 
goal.’ (citation omitted)). 
18 Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ¶ 72, 250 P.3d 465 (“A statute that 
infringes upon [a] ‘fundamental’ right is subject to heightened scrutiny and is 
unconstitutional unless it (1) furthers a compelling state interest and (2) ‘the means adopted 
are narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose.’ ” (citation omitted)). To the 
extent Judd, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 30, 103 P.3d 135, holds that the rational basis test should be 
used in a substantive due process case implicating Article I, section 11 because the rights 
implicated there were not “fundamental,” that conclusion is at odds with federal 
constitutional analysis and provides far less protection for the right of access to the courts 
under the Utah Constitution.  


